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REAPPORTIONMENT: SUCCESS STORY OF
THE WARREN COURT
Robert B. AicKay*
·warren became Chief Justice of the United States in October 1953. Shortly after the end of his fifteenth term in office,
Chief Justice Warren indicated his wish to retire upon Senate confirmation of a successor. ·when President Johnson's nomination of
Associate Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice was passed over
without action in the closing days of the ninetieth Congress, ·warren
resumed the center seat for the October 1968 term rather than let
the position remain vacant. But in so doing the Chief Justice let it
be known that he had not given up hope of retiring in the near
future to permit work outside the Court for the more efficient administration of justice.
Whether Earl \Varren continues as Chief Justice for a short time
only or for several years, 1968 will almost certainly be regarded as a
proper vantage point for reviewing the work of the Warren Court.
As the Kennedy-Johnson period comes to a close, President Nixon
will undoubtedly have several nominations to make to the Court;
these nominations will probably bear a different stamp from those
of the recent past, as indeed the problems of the next period will
themselves be different from those that faced the Warren Court.
From the perspective of history, a decade and a half is not long.
But in the history of the Supreme Court of the United States, the
period from 1953 to 1968 ·was uniquely important. Even the first
fifteen years of John Marshall's long tenure as Chief Justice did not
produce decisions more.noteworthy than those of the Warren Court.
Of the opinions delivered between 1801 and 1816, the only ones
that were inescapably marked with lasting significance for the constitutional process in the l'nited States were 1.vlarbury v. Madison 1
and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee/· Although the vital principles of
judicial review and federal supremacy in the judicial system were
developed during the early years of the Marshall Court, these doctrines scarcely touched the social fabric of the day. Cases before the
\Varren Court, on the other hand, have more often than not involved social issues critically important to every level of American
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society. Ind~ed, the fundamental concept of federalism itself has
been re-examined in the context of problems that stirred the conscience and aroused the passions of contemporary society. To understand fully the impact of the Warren Court, one need only reflect
upon four principal areas in which the Court has helped to reshape
the nation's destiny.
First. The revolution in race relations might have come without
Supreme Court participation; but there is no denying that it dates
from Brown v. Board of Education, 8 an opinion ·written by Chief
Justice Warren during his first term. It is true that the problems of
school segregation and racial discrimination have not been resolved
in the intervening fourteen years, but no one should have expected
that any number of judicial statements could work that kind of
magic even though the Warren Court's desegregation decisions so
clearly spoke the conscience of the majority and so properly expressed the constitutional ideals of the nation. The Court has said
and done most of what it can say and do. The balance is up to Congress and to the people, and there the matter now rests uneasily.
Second. The early years of the Warren Court coincided with the
high tide of McCarthyism in the United States-a period of suspicion, incipient isolationism, and limitation of first amendment
freedoms. The Warren Court reasserted the values of the open
society for which the Constitution stands and rode out the storm of
congressional and public criticism during the late 1950's. The first
amendment decisions during that period and in the early 1960's provided significant encouragement to those who resisted the thenprevailing preference for conformity of opinion, expression, and
conduct.
'Third. Standards of fairness in the criminal justice system deserve the closest judicial scrutiny; any such examination presents
problems that are difficult of rational solution at any time, but
particularly so when the public's natural concern for "law and
order" has been sloganized into a criticism of Supreme Court efforts
to assure fairness in criminal procedure. The Warren Court has
nonetheless staked out major guidelines for virtually every significant aspect of criminal justice. Unless the Warren Court's successor unexpectedly revises the principles that now control the right
to counsel, search and seizure, self-incrimination, and the rest, ·we
may anticipate that the natural process of adjustment will involve
matters of detail rather than major overhaul. .
Fourth. The only complete newcomer on the federal judicial
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

December 1968)

Re~pportionment

225

scene during the decade and a half of the ·warren Court is legislative
apportionment and congressional districting, the subject of the
present comments. The fascinating thing about this major engagement of the Warren Court is that the principal decisions came to the
Court late-1962 and after. Although these decisions precipitated a
revolution in the concept and practice of legislative representation
at every level of government, they were implemented quickly and
with surprisingly little dislocation. The following remarks are intended to report the fact of that adjustment and to explain, to the
extent the phenomenon is now understandable, why the change was
so easily accomplished. When compared with the delay in public
acceptance of decisions in the other areas mentioned above, the
success of the reapportionment cases seems even more remarkable.
Others in this Symposium have commented on the other major areas
of Supreme Court action during the last fifteen years, building in
each case on what had gone before. My story is limited to the six
years between 1962 and 1968.

J.

MALAPPORTIONMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS4

Until 1962, there was no recognized remedy in federal courts for
even the most extreme inequality of population among othenvise
compar2ble legislative representation districts. It made no difference
whether the disparity was among the congressional districts in a
state, election districts for a state legislature, or local government
districts of various types. Between 1872' and 1929 Congress had
required that members of the House of Representatives be elected
from districts "containing as nearly as practicable an equal number
of inhabitants."5 However, this provision was never enforced, and it
was eliminated altogether in 1929.6 Population differentials soared;
by 1964 the most populous district in each of six states had more
than three times the number of persons in the least populous, and
nearly all congressional districts were seriously out of balance. 7 In
addition, almost none of the state courts sought to correct the even
more severe malapportionment that existed in state legislatures8 and
4. For further discussion of the matters commented on in the statement that follows, see R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LA.w AND
POLITICS (1968); R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LA.w AND Pouncs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1964).
5. I 7 Stat. 28 (1872).
6. 46 Stat. 21.
7. Wesberry v. Sanders, !176 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1964) (appendix to opinion of Justice
Harlan).
8. Ratios between the most populous and least populous district in a state were
not uncommonly more than 100 to I.
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local governmental bodies, despite the fact that some specific state
constitutional provisions required substantial equality of population.
By 1960 malapportionment in the United States had attained
such proportions that the integrity of representative government was
in many instances endangered. Yet the extent of the disparity continued to grow, fortified as it was by four assumptions from the past
that had become unreliable guides to the future in the 1960's.
First, until 1962 it was widely believed that federal courts would
not review individual voter complaints about malapportionment,
either because they lacked jurisdiction over such matters, or because
the claims were not justiciable, or for both reasons. There was considerable basis for this belief, supported as it apparently was by
Colegrove v. Green, 9 in which Justice Frankfurter had cautioned that
"[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket." 10 Although a few
commentators had warned that Colegrove-decided in 1946-should
not be read as a denial of jurisdiction and/or justiciability, the
issue was not squarely faced in the Supreme Court again until 1962,
when the Court held in Baker v. Carr11 that claims of population
inequality among election districts are indeed within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts; that the issues are justiciable; and that individual voters have standing to raise the issues. Thus fell the first assumption-the procedural gambit-leaving as the next line of
defense assumption number two: the substantive claim that no
provision of the Constitution requires substantial equality of population among election districts.
During the period when it was generally believed that the Court
would not review claims of legislative malapportionment, there was
no great need for defenders of the status quo to develop elaborate
constitutional arguments in behalf of an issue they thought could
not arise. With the decision in Baker v. Carr, however, all that was
changed. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in basing their dissents to
Baker mainly on the justiciability issue, previewed the more refined
arguments Justice Harfan was later to make (sometimes joined by
Justices Clark and Stewart) in Reynolds v. Sims12 and the companion
cases decided in 1964.13 But assumption number two was laid to rest
9. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10. 328 U.S. at 556. See also MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) and cases
discussed, and distinguished, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. 377 U.S. 533 "(1964).
13. Justice Harlan's dissent for all the cases appears in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 589 (1964). The principal dissenting statement of Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Clark, appears ~n Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964),
applicable also to WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
Justice Harlan, who alone finds the fourteenth amendment totally inappli•
cable, has restated and refined his argument in subsequent apportionment cases,
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in Reynolds,1'1 which held with exquisite simplicity that "the Equal
Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good
faith effort to construct districts, in both Houses of its legislature, as·
nearly of equal population as is practicable." 15
A third assumption was that even if the fourteenth amendment
could be interpreted to require population equality in state legislative election districts, there was nothing in that amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution that would impose a similar limitation on
the drawing of congressional district lines by state legislatures. However, when this question was presented to the Court in Wesberry v.
Sanders16 (before the decision in Reynolds), only Justice Clark
thought the equal protection clause determinative; 17 and Justices
Harlan and Stewart thought that no constitutional provision limited
congressional districting. But six members of the Court found a
command of substantial population-equality in article I, section 2, of
the Constitution, which provides that representatives be chosen "by
the People of the Several States." In an extensive review of historical
sources, Justice Black concluded for the majority that this clause
"means that as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." 18
A fourth and final assumption, to which the Court put the lie in
1968 in Avery v. Midland County, 19 was the lingering belief, even
after Reynolds, that the representative function in local governmental units ·was somehow different than in state legislative bodies.
For a time there seemed to be some basis for this view, at least where
the local governmental units had no obvious legislative functions. 20
But in Avery the Court held, as should have been expected from the
beginning, that the Constitution permits no substantial variation
from equal population jn drawing districts for units of local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.21
including Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968).
Justices Harlan and Stewart have also objected to application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in other political rights cases, including
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966), a dissent applicable also to Cardona
v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
14. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
15. 377 U.S. at 568, 577.
16. 376 U.S. I (19nH.
17. The majority did not find it necessary to consider the fourteenth amendment
in view of its conclu•ion that art. I, § 2 requires equality among congressional dis•
tricts, 376 U.S. at 8 n.10.
·
18. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
19. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
20. See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387
U.S. 112 (1967).
21. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). For further discussion, see
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IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT

A. The Initial Response
The Supreme Court decisions that applied the equal-population
principle to all levels of government were thought by some to have
saved representative government from self-destruction. Others, like
Senator Barry Goldwater in his unsuccessful presidential campaign
of 1964, viewed the decisions as an abuse of judicial power not justified by any provision of the Constitution. Friends and critics alike
agreed on one proposition: Representative government in the
United States would be significantly affected by implementation of
the new requirement.
In 1968, just four years after Reynolds, and in the same year as
Avery, the public outcry has faded to a whisper. -Criticism of the
Supreme Court, a noisy issue in the 19lIB _presidential campaign, did
not emphasize the reapportionment decisions. The mood, even
among politicians, is that the ded.sions are acceptable; the accommodations have largely been made.
In retrospect, this development is not hard to understand. The
initial objections to the decisions came from two groups whose
uneasy alliance should never have been expected to come to much.
First, there were the intellectual critics who express alarm at each
new judicial intervention in matters that they had not previously
admitted to the charmed circle of federal judicial authority. These
critics were more concerned with Baker v. Carr, which they regarded
as a breach of their first canon, judicial restraint, than with the substance of the rules in Wesberry, Reynolds, and llvery. The second
group of critics were the "practical" politicians, particularly those
who saw in reapportionment a threat not only to their legislative
power, but also sometimes to their very seats.
Perhaps sensing that this alliance of principle and self-interest
could not long survive,- opponents of reapportionment swiftly
mounted an attack on the decisions-and on the Court itself-in
Congress. At first, efforts were made to limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts so that most reapportionment cases could not be
heard; but this was too frontal an attack even for many critics of
the decisions and the Court. Next, amendment of the Constitution
was sought in order to provide that the equal-population principle
would apply to only one house of a bicameral state legislature. The
final attack, and the most nearly successful, was the campaign for a
constitutional convention under a never-used provision of article V
Symposium: One Man-One _Vote and Local Government, 36 G:Eo. ,VASH. L. REV. 689
(196S).
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of the Constitution. Ultimately, all of these efforts were unsuccessfu1.22
Direct frontal attack on the decisions-by constitutional amendment or otherwise-was probably never destined to make much
progress for the simple reason that the public did not oppose the
decisions. This should not have been surprising since malapportionment had worked to the disadvantage of a majority of all the voters,
including the politically sophisticated and highly vocal group in the
cities and suburbs.
B. Reapportionment Effected-The Success Story
\Vhen Wesberry and Reynolds were decided in 1964, students of
the political process believed that accommodation to the equalpopulation standard would be accomplished, if at all, only after
extensive litigation that would take many years, perhaps decades.
For once, the prophets of gloom were wrong; it is not easy to think
of any other major Supreme Court decisions to which significant
adjustment was so swiftly accomplished. While there was some footdragging, and judicial proceedings were often necessary, the astonishing fact is that by the spring of 1968, four years after the key
decisions, the task of revision was essentially complete.
"W'ithin this period congressional district lines were redrawn in
thirty-seven states. Of the remaining thirteen, five have a single representative each; two elect representatives at large; and several did
not require redistricting. Although several states may need further
change for reasons discussed in the final section of this Article, the
fact remains that by April 1968 only nine states had any district with
a population deviation .hi excess of ten per cent from the state average, while twenty-four states had no deviation as large as five per cent
from the state norm. 23
State legislatures responded with similar speed and integrity to
the even more painful task of redrawing their own district lines;
this often entailed the necessary consequence of making impossible the re-election of some of their own members. By the spring
of 1968 every state had made some adjustment, and it seemed probable that more than thirty of the state legislatures satisfied any reasonable interpretation of the equal-population principle.
22. For a review of these campaigns, see Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and
the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REv. 949 (1968); McKay, Court, Congress. and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REv. 255 (1964).
23. Bulletin of ILGWU [International Ladies' Garment Workers Union] Political
Department (April 22, 1968).
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C. Substantive Impact-The Character of the Reapportioned
Bodies
Reapportionment and redistricting are still too new to permit
definitive evaluation of their impact. Even before careful study is
completed, however, some conclusions can be drawn. It was no surprise to those familiar with the pattern of malapportionment, for
example, that the principal beneficiaries of reapportionment and
redistricting were less the cities than the suburbs. In the decade
between the 1950 and 1960 censuses eight of the largest cities in the
United States lost population, while the suburbs gained population
from urban and rural areas alike. One result of this population shift
was that in some Southern states, particularly Florida and Tennessee,
a genuine two-party system emerged as suburban voters began to
pursue aggressively specific political goals. This was not, however,
an exclusively Southern phenomenon according to Republican Party
analysts, who concluded from study of the 1966 congressional races
that Republicans might gain from ten to twenty-five seats in the
House of Representatives in twenty-two states.24
Another predictable consequence of fair apportionment was the
unseating of a number of legislators. Where prior malapportionment
had been severe, the turnover was correspondingly large. For example, the first legislature after reapportionment in Maryland contained eighty per cent freshman legislators; in Connecticut more
than half were new; anq. in California nearly half of the members
of the legislature were there for the first time.
·w"ith the influx of so many inexperienced legislators there was
sometimes a certain amount of confusion about goals and techniques. But the novice legislators frequently seized the reins of
authority with surprising decisiveness, often with results that were
applauded; seldom were they criticized for being less effective than
their predecessors in the exercise of power. Moreover, the size of
the legislature was -dramatically reduced in several instances, a
change approved by most students of government. The Connecticut
house ·was reduced from 294 representatives to 177; the Vermont
house from 246 to 150; and the Ohio legislature from 137 to 99.
Evaluation of legislative performance is in the eye of the beholder; thus, it is difficult to generalize about the success of legislative programs after reapportionment. However, there were observable trends in the form of increased_aid for schools, greater home
rule, increased consumer protection, stronger civil rights legislation,
24. See ~fcKay, Reapportionment Reappraised 18-19 (Twentieth Century l;und
pamphlet 1968).
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· urbs on air and water pollution, and reform of criminal justice.
.\.. reapportioned Missouri legislature was hailed by the St. Louis
0
ost Dispatch as probably "the most creative session in the mid-term
Jf a governor in the State's history." 25 And a study of the 1966 and
1968 biennial session of the Virginia general assembly concluded.
that "[b]oth sessions enacted outstanding legislative programs in
response to strong gubernatorial leadership and growing public demands for more and better governmental services."26
The fears that reapportionment would lead to urban dominance
did not materialize in such primarily rural states as Idaho, Kansas,
l\fontana, and North Dakota. In New Mexico the Farm and Livestock Bureau, the state's largest agricultural organization, pronounced the reapportioned legislature "one of the finest"; and the
reapportioned Vermont house drew "lavish praise from all quarters"
for its 1966 session.27
The impact of reapportionment on local government is necessarily more speculative because of the almost infinite variety of local
government structures-counties, cities, school boards, and other
special purpose districts, to name only the most common.28 But there
is reason for cautious optimism that fairly based election districts
will be as salutary for local government as for state legislatures.

Ill.

SOME OPEN QUESTIONS

As a matter of wise institutional policy, the Supreme Court of
the United States ordinarily does not try to answer at first encounter
every question that might arise in connection with a novel problem.
The reapportionment decisions are almost unique in the comprehensiveness of the early_ rulings. There are of course some unanswered questions in the wake of these decisions, but the number is
surprisingly small. The original decisions were sweeping, direct, and
relatively clear. Qualifications were few, except for the fairly obvious
reminder that in state legislative districting (or in drawing lines for
congressional districts and local government units), "it is a practical
impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an
identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical
exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement."20
25. Id. at 17.
'26. Wells, A Pattern Emerges, 57 NATL. Crv. REv. 453 (1968).
'27. McKay, supra note 24, at 17-18.
28. See S•ymposium, sllpra note 21.
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From this qualification more or less directly arise three important
questions for which final answers have not been given-and perhaps
should not yet be expected-because key elements in these decisions
depend upon relatively indefinite factors of judgment. Nevertheless,
guidance is available, both in the Court's original decisions and in
its subsequent reaffirmations of the principles involved. The questions, to which brief answers are suggested below, are (1) What population deviations are consistent with the standard of substantial
population equality? (2) To what extent, if any, is the gerrymander
forbidden by the Constitution? (3) What agency should be given
authority to draw election district lines?

A. Substantial Population Equality
The standard fixed by the Court for congressional districting,
state legislative apportionment, and local government line-drawing
was similar, if not precisely identical, in the three principal decisions. The operative language in Avery is typical of the Court's
formulations in the other reapportionment cases: "We hold today
only that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from
equal population in drawing districts for units of local government
having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area
served by the body." 30
Although the Court emphasized in Reynolds, Wesberry, and
Avery that mathematical exactness is not required, 81 it has insisted
that population is the only proper basis of apportionment. In
Reynolds the Court stated that "neither history alone, nor economics
or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation." 32
And in Avery the Court restated Reynolds as a holding that "bases
other than population [are] not acceptable grounds for distinguish30. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968). In Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 7-8, the Court said: "The command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives
be chosen 'by the People of the several states' means that as nearly as practicable,
one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another•s." And
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) the standard was thus defined: "We
hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis."
31. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
577, 579 (1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968). In Reynolds
the Court observed that "[s]omewhat more flexibility may be constitutionally per•
missible with respect to state legislative apportionment than in congressional district•
ing." 377 U.S. at 578. This is because of the greater number of districts in state
legislatures so that local political subdivision lines may be used more extensively in
state legislative districting than in congressional districting.
32. 377 U.S. at 579-80.
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ing among citizens when determining the size of districts used to
elect members of state legislatures." 33
From this proposition-that population is the only permissible
standard for districting even though mathematical exactness is not
required-another proposition logically follows: population deviations among districts must be justified by the state. This principle
emerged clearly in Swann v. Adams,84 where the variations were
thirty per cent among senate districts and forty per cent among
house districts. The Court said, "De minimis deviations are unavoidable, but . . . none of our cases suggest that differences of this
magnitude will be approved without a satisfactory explanation
grounded on acceptable state policy."35 Deviations from equality
require justification, and the burden is on the state to supply rational
explanation for instances of inequality. Apparently, the only acceptable justification for population variances is the use of political
subdivision lines or other logical division lines in order to structure
coherent districts. Use of such pre-established boundary lines may
prevent an otherwise destructive gerrymander, but where this factor
is claimed as the reason for population inequality, it must be demonstrated. The New Jersey Supreme Court made the point specifically in Jones v. Falcey: "Where the deviation obviously exceeds
that needed to permit the use of political subdivisions, the deviation
spells out unconstitutionality, and a court must so hold unless the
record affirmatively reveals a tenable basis for legislative action." 36
Some have sought a judicial statement of percentage points of
maximum permissible deviation, but such a holding is not likely.
The standard remains population equality-quite strict in congressional districting cases and somewhat more flexible for-state and local
legislative bodies.

B. The Forbidden Gerrymander
The gerrymander is a practice-tested and time-dishonored device
of American politics that has been used most often for partisan advantage, but sometimes has also served to break up (or to combine)
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic groups thought to have common
interests. Malapportionment is itself a particular kind of gerrymander in which advantage or disadvantage is based upon population
concentration or dispersion. In the United States the population
gerrymander usually, but not always, has been used to prefer rural
over urban and suburban groups. The reapportionment decisions
33.
34.
35.
36.

390 U.S. at 484.
385 U.S. 440 (1967).
385 U.S. at 444.
48 N.J. 25, 40, 222 A.2d 101, 109 (1966).
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have ruled that the population gerrymander is constitutionally forbidden, but initially at least there was little direct guidance on racial
and partisan gerrymandering.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot 31 is the only case before 1968 in which
the Court reached the merits of a claimed racial gerrymander; the
Court held that the redrawing of municipal lines to exclude Negro
voters was a violation of the fifteenth amendment.38 Other cases that
sought to raise the racial gerrymander issue have not been successfully pressed to a decision on the merits. In Wright v. Rockefeller,39
a majority of the Court accepted "the findings of the majority of
the District Court that appellants failed to prove that the New York
Legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact
drew the districts on racial lines." 40 There was, however, nothing in
the majority opinion to suggest approval of racial gerrymandering.
Both dissenting opinions, by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, specifically stated that racially motivated districting is unconstitutional, 41
a proposition to which the majority took no exception, and with
which disagreement is scarcely possible.
Although gerrymandering for partisan advantage has also not
been squarely presented to the Court for decision, there is reason
to believe that this, too, would be struck down upon a sufficient
showing of political motivation in apportionment formulas or districting practices. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 42 the Court, commenting on
a multimember constituency apportionment scheme, worried about
the possibility that this method might in some circumstances "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."43
Three cases scheduled for argument before the Supreme Court
in December 1968 raise the question of partisan gerrymandering,
37. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
38. Only Justice Whittaker thought that the case presented a violation of four•
teenth amendment equal protection rights. 364 U.S. at 349. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the majority, apparently felt that judicial review on fourteenth amendment
grounds was barred by Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), which he said "involved
a claim only of a dilution of the strength of their votes as a result of legislative
inaction over a course of many years." But Gomillion, he said, involved "affirmative
legislative action [that] deprives them of their votes and the consequent advantages
that the ballot affords." 364 U.S. at 346. He may also have been seeking to preserve
the Colegrove principle of nonjusticiability against the attack mounted in Baker v.
Carr, in which probable jurisdiction was noted one week after the decision in
Gomillion. 364 U.S. 898 (1960).
39. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). See also Connor v. Johnson, 386 U.S. 483 (1967); Honeywood v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
40. 376 U.S. at 56.
41. See also Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Ala; 1965); Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U.S. 433; 439 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
42. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
43. 379 U.S. at 439.
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and pm,~ibly of racial gerr}mandering as well. Two of the cases,
Preisler v. KirkpatrickH and Preisler v. Heinkel, 45 arise out of a
holding by a three-judge district court that the 1967 congressional
redistrictmg in Missouri did not satisfy the constitutional standard
of population equality as nearly as practicable. The third case, Wells
v. Rockefeller, 46 is an appeal from the decision of a three-judge
federal district court upholding the 1968 congressional redistricting
in New York against a challenge of partisan gerrymandering and
excessive population variances. Decision of these cases should provide guidance on the remaining questions about the propriety of
gerrymandering.

C. Redistricting: Who Will Bell the Cat'!
The habit of legislative redistricting for partisan advantage is so
deeply ingrained in the American legislative and political structure
that it will be rooted out only with difficulty. The effort must be
made, for the stakes are high: the effective functioning of representative democracy. Unfortunately, the answers are not easy. Implementation of the equal-population principle is an essential ingredient of ultimate success, but it is by no means a self-contained solution.
Within the framework of absolute equality it is entirely possible to
pervert the electoral process; the contortions of the gerrymander
remain within easy grasp. Even judicial willingness to forbid racial,
partisan, and other gerrymandering can protect against only the
most blatant abuses.
There is accordingly an imperative need in every state for some
politically acceptable device to remove the district line-drawing
function from the paJ:"tisan process. By 1967 seventeen states had
committed a portion of the apportionment or districting function
to nonlegislative agencies.47 These plans range from executive initiative after legislative inaction for a specified period of time to a
constitutionally established board of apportionment consisting of
the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general. But none of
the present plans is sufficiently removed from the ongoing political
process to prevent partisan influence from taking its due. The question that urgently requires thoughtful debate is whether American
democracy is now sufficiently mature to agree upon a nonpolitical
44.
45.
46.
47.

279 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Mo. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 390 U.S. 939 (1968).
279 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. ~fo. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 390 U.S. 939 (1968).
281 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.X.Y.), prob. juris. noted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3133 (Oct. 15, 1968).
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means of resolving this vital question of representative government
-finding the best method for structuring election districts.48
48. The following statement of principles deserves study as approved by the Citi•
zens Union Committee on Constitutional Issues, Position Paper No. I, April 1967
(quoted from pages 55-56 of Legislative Districting by Non-Legislative Agencies, supra
note 47). The proposed plan relates to New York State.
Reapportionment Outside the Legislature
Recommendations:
The following recommendations are not stated in formal constitutional language, but easily could be converted into a concise provision on legislative apportionment.
Legislative Districts
For the purpose of electing members of the Legislature (each house if there
are to be two houses) the state should be divided into as many districts as there
are members to be elected. Each district should consist of compact and contiguous
territory.
All state legislative districts should be so nearly equal in population that no
district has over 10 per cent more or less population than the statewide average
for all districts.
Among state legislative districts wholly contained within a single county, no
district should be allowed to have over 5 per cent more or less population than
the average district population in that county.
Among state legislative districts wholly or partly within a city or town (or,
in New York City, within a borough) no district should be allowed to have over
one per cent more or less population than the average population of districts
in that city, town or borough.
As nearly as is possible under the requirements of population equality, no
county, city, town or village boundary should be crossed in the formation of
districts.
At no time should a block enclosed by streets or public ways be divided.
Apportionment and Districting Commission
Within thirty days after receipt of the final figures of the decennial United
States census, the Governor, after inviting nominations from the presidents of
the state's institutions of higher learning, civic, educational, professional, and
other organizations, should be required to name a ten-member commission to
reapportion and 'redistrict the state legislative districts.
No member or employee of the Le!!islature
should be allowed to be a mem0
ber of the commission.
No more than five members of the commission should be allowed to be
enrolled in the same political party.
The Governor should list at least one source for the nomination of each
member of the commission.
. If by reason of resignation, death or disability, any member of the commiss10n should be_ unable to perform his duties, a successor shall be appointed by
the Governor in the same manner as an original member of the commission is
appointed.
The Legislature should be required to provide sufficient funds for the operation of the commission.
. All decisions of the commission should be required to have the approval of
six or more members.
Within ninety days of its appointment, the commission should submit its
redistricting plan to the Governor, who, within thirty days after receipt of the
plan, should be allowed to recommend amendment to the commission.
Thirty days thereafter the commission should promulgate its plan, with or
without amendments.
The commission's plan should be published in the manner provided for acts
of the Legislature and should have the force of law upon such publication.
Upon the application of any qualified voter, the Court of Appeals, in the
.exercise of original, exclusive and final jurisdiction, should review the commission's redistricting plan and should have jurisdiction to ·make orders to amend
the plan to comply with the requirements of this constitution or, if the commission has failed to promulgate a redistricting plan within the time provided,
to make one or more orders establishing such a plan.

